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CRYPTSETUP(8)                Maintenance Commands                CRYPTSETUP(8)

NAME
       cryptsetup - manage plain dm-crypt, LUKS, and other encrypted volumes

SYNOPSIS
       cryptsetup <action> [<options>] <action args>

DESCRIPTION
       cryptsetup is used to conveniently setup dm-crypt managed device-mapper
       mappings. These include plain dm-crypt volumes and LUKS volumes. The
       difference is that LUKS uses a metadata header and can hence offer more
       features than plain dm-crypt. On the other hand, the header is visible
       and vulnerable to damage.

       In addition, cryptsetup provides limited support for the use of
       loop-AES volumes, TrueCrypt, VeraCrypt, BitLocker and FileVault2
       compatible volumes, and for hardware-based encryption on OPAL capable
       drives.

       For more information about specific cryptsetup action see
       cryptsetup-<action>(8), where <action> is the name of the cryptsetup
       action.

BASIC ACTIONS
       The following are valid actions for all supported device types.

   OPEN
       open <device> <name> --type <device_type>

       Opens (creates a mapping with) <name> backed by device <device>.
       See cryptsetup-open(8).

   CLOSE
       close <name>

       Removes the existing mapping <name> and wipes the key from kernel
       memory.
       See cryptsetup-close(8).

   STATUS
       status <name>

       Reports the status for the mapping <name>.
       See cryptsetup-status(8).

   RESIZE
       resize <name>

       Resizes an active mapping <name>.
       See cryptsetup-resize(8).

   REFRESH
       refresh <name>

       Refreshes parameters of active mapping <name>.
       See cryptsetup-refresh(8).

   REENCRYPT
       reencrypt <device> or --active-name <name> [<new_name>]

       Run LUKS device reencryption.
       See cryptsetup-reencrypt(8).

PLAIN MODE
       Plain dm-crypt encrypts the device sector-by-sector with a single,
       non-salted hash of the passphrase. No checks are performed, no metadata
       is used. There is no formatting operation. When the raw device is
       mapped (opened), the usual device operations can be used on the mapped
       device, including filesystem creation. Mapped devices usually reside in
       /dev/mapper/<name>.

       The following are valid plain device type actions:

   OPEN
       open --type plain <device> <name>
       create <name> <device> (OBSOLETE syntax)

       Opens (creates a mapping with) <name> backed by device <device>.
       See cryptsetup-open(8).

LUKS EXTENSION
       LUKS, the Linux Unified Key Setup, is a standard for disk encryption.
       It adds a standardized header at the start of the device, a key-slot
       area directly behind the header and the bulk data area behind that. The
       whole set is called a 'LUKS container'. The device that a LUKS
       container resides on is called a 'LUKS device'. For most purposes, both
       terms can be used interchangeably. But note that when the LUKS header
       is at a nonzero offset in a device, then the device is not a LUKS
       device anymore, but has a LUKS container stored in it at an offset.

       LUKS can manage multiple passphrases that can be individually revoked
       or changed and that can be securely scrubbed from persistent media due
       to the use of anti-forensic stripes. Passphrases are protected against
       brute-force and dictionary attacks by Password-Based Key Derivation
       Function (PBKDF).

       LUKS2 is a new version of header format that allows additional
       extensions like different PBKDF algorithm or authenticated encryption.
       You can format device with LUKS2 header if you specify --type luks2 in
       luksFormat command. For activation, the format is already recognized
       automatically.

       Each passphrase, also called a key in this document, is associated with
       one of 8 key-slots. Key operations that do not specify a slot affect
       the first slot that matches the supplied passphrase or the first empty
       slot if a new passphrase is added.

       The <device> parameter can also be specified by a LUKS UUID in the
       format UUID=<uuid>. Translation to real device name uses symlinks in
       /dev/disk/by-uuid directory.

       To specify a detached header, the --header parameter can be used in all
       LUKS commands and always takes precedence over the positional <device>
       parameter.

       The following are valid LUKS actions:

   FORMAT
       luksFormat <device> [<key file>]

       Initializes a LUKS partition and sets the initial passphrase (for
       key-slot 0).
       See cryptsetup-luksFormat(8).

   OPEN
       open --type luks <device> <name>
       luksOpen <device> <name> (old syntax)

       Opens the LUKS device <device> and sets up a mapping <name> after
       successful verification of the supplied passphrase.
       See cryptsetup-open(8).

   SUSPEND
       luksSuspend <name>

       Suspends an active device (all IO operations will block and accesses to
       the device will wait indefinitely) and wipes the encryption key from
       kernel memory.
       See cryptsetup-luksSuspend(8).

   RESUME
       luksResume <name>

       Resumes a suspended device and reinstates the encryption key.
       See cryptsetup-luksResume(8).

   ADD KEY
       luksAddKey <device> [<key file with new key>]

       Adds a new passphrase using an existing passphrase.
       See cryptsetup-luksAddKey(8).

   REMOVE KEY
       luksRemoveKey <device> [<key file with passphrase to be removed>]

       Removes the supplied passphrase from the LUKS device.
       See cryptsetup-luksRemoveKey(8).

   CHANGE KEY
       luksChangeKey <device> [<new key file>]

       Changes an existing passphrase.
       See cryptsetup-luksChangeKey(8).

   CONVERT KEY
       luksConvertKey <device>

       Converts an existing LUKS2 keyslot to new PBKDF parameters.
       See cryptsetup-luksConvertKey(8).

   KILL SLOT
       luksKillSlot <device> <key slot number>

       Wipe the key-slot number <key slot> from the LUKS device.
       See cryptsetup-luksKillSlot(8).

   ERASE
       erase <device>
       luksErase <device> (old syntax)

       Erase all keyslots and make the LUKS container permanently
       inaccessible.
       See cryptsetup-erase(8).

   UUID
       luksUUID <device>

       Print or set the UUID of a LUKS device.
       See cryptsetup-luksUUID(8).

   IS LUKS
       isLuks <device>

       Returns true, if <device> is a LUKS device, false otherwise.
       See cryptsetup-isLuks(8).

   DUMP
       luksDump <device>

       Dump the header information of a LUKS device.
       See cryptsetup-luksDump(8).

   HEADER BACKUP
       luksHeaderBackup <device> --header-backup-file <file>

       Stores a binary backup of the LUKS header and keyslot area.
       See cryptsetup-luksHeaderBackup(8).

   HEADER RESTORE
       luksHeaderRestore <device> --header-backup-file <file>

       Restores a binary backup of the LUKS header and keyslot area from the
       specified file.
       See cryptsetup-luksHeaderRestore(8).

   TOKEN
       token <add|remove|import|export> <device>

       Manipulate token objects used for obtaining passphrases.
       See cryptsetup-token(8).

   CONVERT
       convert <device> --type <format>

       Converts the device between LUKS1 and LUKS2 format (if possible).
       See cryptsetup-convert(8).

   CONFIG
       config <device>

       Set permanent configuration options (store to LUKS header).
       See cryptsetup-config(8).

LOOP-AES EXTENSION
       cryptsetup supports mapping loop-AES encrypted partition using a
       compatibility mode.

   OPEN
       open --type loopaes <device> <name> --key-file <keyfile>
       loopaesOpen <device> <name> --key-file <keyfile> (old syntax)

       Opens the loop-AES <device> and sets up a mapping <name>.
       See cryptsetup-open(8).

       See also section 7 of the FAQ and loop-AES
       <http://loop-aes.sourceforge.net> for more information regarding
       loop-AES.

TCRYPT (TRUECRYPT AND VERACRYPT COMPATIBLE) EXTENSION
       cryptsetup supports mapping of TrueCrypt, tcplay or VeraCrypt encrypted
       partition using a native Linux kernel API. Header formatting and TCRYPT
       header change is not supported, cryptsetup never changes TCRYPT header
       on-device.

       TCRYPT extension requires kernel userspace crypto API to be available
       (introduced in Linux kernel 2.6.38). If you are configuring kernel
       yourself, enable "User-space interface for symmetric key cipher
       algorithms" in "Cryptographic API" section (CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER
       .config option).

       Because TCRYPT header is encrypted, you have to always provide valid
       passphrase and keyfiles.

       Cryptsetup should recognize all header variants, except legacy cipher
       chains using LRW encryption mode with 64 bits encryption block (namely
       Blowfish in LRW mode is not recognized, this is limitation of kernel
       crypto API).

       VeraCrypt is extension of TrueCrypt header with increased iteration
       count so unlocking can take quite a lot of time.

       To open a VeraCrypt device with a custom Personal Iteration Multiplier
       (PIM) value, use either the --veracrypt-pim=<PIM> option to directly
       specify the PIM on the command- line or use --veracrypt-query-pim to be
       prompted for the PIM.

       The PIM value affects the number of iterations applied during key
       derivation. Please refer to PIM
       <https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Personal%20Iterations%20Multiplier%20%28PIM%29.html>
       for more detailed information.

       If you need to disable VeraCrypt device support, use
       --disable-veracrypt option.

       NOTE: Activation with tcryptOpen is supported only for cipher chains
       using LRW or XTS encryption modes.

       The tcryptDump command should work for all recognized TCRYPT devices
       and doesn't require superuser privilege.

       To map system device (device with boot loader where the whole encrypted
       system resides) use --tcrypt-system option. You can use partition
       device as the parameter (parameter must be real partition device, not
       an image in a file), then only this partition is mapped.

       If you have the whole TCRYPT device as a file image and you want to map
       multiple partition encrypted with system encryption, please create
       loopback mapping with partitions first (losetup -P, see losetup(8) man
       page for more info), and use loop partition as the device parameter.

       If you use the whole base device as a parameter, one device for the
       whole system encryption is mapped. This mode is available only for
       backward compatibility with older cryptsetup versions which mapped
       TCRYPT system encryption using the whole device.

       To use hidden header (and map hidden device, if available), use
       --tcrypt-hidden option.

       To explicitly use backup (secondary) header, use --tcrypt-backup
       option.

       NOTE: There is no protection for a hidden volume if the outer volume is
       mounted. The reason is that if there were any protection, it would
       require some metadata describing what to protect in the outer volume
       and the hidden volume would become detectable.

   OPEN
       open --type tcrypt <device> <name>
       tcryptOpen_ <device> <name> (old syntax)

       Opens the TCRYPT (a TrueCrypt-compatible) <device> and sets up a
       mapping <name>.
       See cryptsetup-open(8).

   DUMP
       tcryptDump <device>

       Dump the header information of a TCRYPT device.
       See cryptsetup-tcryptDump(8).

       See also TrueCrypt <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TrueCrypt> and
       VeraCrypt <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VeraCrypt> pages for more
       information.

       Please note that cryptsetup does not use TrueCrypt or VeraCrypt code,
       please report all problems related to this compatibility extension to
       the cryptsetup project.

BITLK (WINDOWS BITLOCKER COMPATIBLE) EXTENSION
       cryptsetup supports mapping of BitLocker and BitLocker to Go encrypted
       partition using a native Linux kernel API. Header formatting and BITLK
       header changes are not supported, cryptsetup never changes BITLK header
       on-device.

       BITLK extension requires kernel userspace crypto API to be available
       (for details see TCRYPT section).

       Cryptsetup should recognize all BITLK header variants, except legacy
       header used in Windows Vista systems and partially decrypted BitLocker
       devices. Activation of legacy devices encrypted in CBC mode requires at
       least Linux kernel version 5.3 and for devices using Elephant diffuser
       kernel 5.6.

       The bitlkDump command should work for all recognized BITLK devices and
       doesn't require superuser privilege.

       For unlocking with the open a password or a recovery passphrase or a
       startup key must be provided.

       Additionally unlocking using volume key is supported. You must provide
       BitLocker Full Volume Encryption Key (FVEK) using the --volume-key-file
       option. The key must be decrypted and without the header (only
       128/256/512 bits of key data depending on used cipher and mode).

       Other unlocking methods (TPM, SmartCard) are not supported.

   OPEN
       open --type bitlk <device> <name>
       bitlkOpen <device> <name> (old syntax)

       Opens the BITLK (a BitLocker-compatible) <device> and sets up a mapping
       <name>.
       See cryptsetup-open(8).

   DUMP
       bitlkDump <device>

       Dump the header information of a BITLK device.
       See cryptsetup-bitlkDump(8).

       Please note that cryptsetup does not use any Windows BitLocker code,
       please report all problems related to this compatibility extension to
       the cryptsetup project.

FVAULT2 (APPLE MACOS FILEVAULT2 COMPATIBLE) EXTENSION
       cryptsetup supports the mapping of FileVault2 (FileVault2 full-disk
       encryption) by Apple for the macOS operating system using a native
       Linux kernel API.

       NOTE: cryptsetup supports only FileVault2 based on Core Storage and
       HFS+ filesystem (introduced in MacOS X 10.7 Lion). It does NOT support
       the new version of FileVault based on the APFS filesystem used in
       recent macOS versions.

       Header formatting and FVAULT2 header changes are not supported;
       cryptsetup never changes the FVAULT2 header on-device.

       FVAULT2 extension requires kernel userspace crypto API to be available
       (for details, see TCRYPT section) and kernel driver for HFS+ (hfsplus)
       filesystem.

       Cryptsetup should recognize the basic configuration for portable
       drives.

       The fvault2Dump command should work for all recognized FVAULT2 devices
       and doesn't require superuser privilege.

       For unlocking with the open, a password must be provided. Other
       unlocking methods are not supported.

   OPEN
       open --type fvault2 <device> <name>
       fvault2Open <device> <name> (old syntax)

       Opens the FVAULT2 (a FileVault2-compatible) <device> (usually the
       second partition on the device) and sets up a mapping <name>.
       See cryptsetup-open(8).

SED (SELF ENCRYPTING DRIVE) OPAL EXTENSION
       cryptsetup supports using native hardware encryption on drives that
       provide an OPAL interface, both nested with dm-crypt and standalone.
       Passphrases, tokens and metadata are stored using the LUKS2 header
       format, and are thus compatible with any software or system that uses
       LUKS2 (e.g.: tokens).

       WARNING: this support is new and experimental, and requires at least
       kernel v6.4. Resizing devices is not supported.

       --hw-opal can be specified for OPAL + dm-crypt, and --hw-opal-only can
       be specified to use OPAL only, without a dm-crypt layer.

       Opening, closing and enrolling tokens work in the same way as with
       LUKS2 and dm-crypt. The new parameters are only necessary when
       formatting, the LUKS2 metadata will ensure the right setup is performed
       when opening or closing. If no subsystem is specified, it will be
       automatically set to HW-OPAL so that it is immediately apparent when a
       device uses OPAL.

   FORMAT
       luksFormat --type luks2 --hw-opal <device> [<key file>]

       Additionally specify --hw-opal-only instead of --hw-opal to avoid the
       dm-crypt layer. Other than the usual passphrase, an admin password will
       have to be specified when formatting the first partition of the drive,
       and will have to be re-supplied when formatting any other partition
       until a factory reset is performed.

   ERASE
       erase <device>

       Securely erase a partition or device. Requires admin password.
       Additionally specify --hw-opal-factory-reset for a FULL factory reset
       of the drive, using the drive's PSID (typically printed on the label)
       instead of the admin password. WARNING: a factory reset will cause ALL
       data on the device to be lost, regardless of the partition it is ran
       on, if any, and regardless of any LUKS2 header backup.

MISCELLANEOUS ACTIONS
   REPAIR
       repair <device>

       Tries to repair the device metadata if possible. Currently supported
       only for LUKS device type.
       See cryptsetup-repair(8).

   BENCHMARK
       benchmark <options>

       Benchmarks ciphers and KDF (key derivation function).
       See cryptsetup-benchmark(8).

PLAIN DM-CRYPT OR LUKS?
       Unless you understand the cryptographic background well, use LUKS. With
       plain dm-crypt there are a number of possible user errors that
       massively decrease security. While LUKS cannot fix them all, it can
       lessen the impact for many of them.

WARNINGS
       A lot of good information on the risks of using encrypted storage, on
       handling problems and on security aspects can be found in the
       Cryptsetup FAQ. Read it. Nonetheless, some risks deserve to be
       mentioned here.

       Backup: Storage media die. Encryption has no influence on that. Backup
       is mandatory for encrypted data as well, if the data has any worth. See
       the Cryptsetup FAQ for advice on how to do a backup of an encrypted
       volume.

       Character encoding: If you enter a passphrase with special symbols, the
       passphrase can change depending on character encoding. Keyboard
       settings can also change, which can make blind input hard or
       impossible. For example, switching from some ASCII 8-bit variant to
       UTF-8 can lead to a different binary encoding and hence different
       passphrase seen by cryptsetup, even if what you see on the terminal is
       exactly the same. It is therefore highly recommended to select
       passphrase characters only from 7-bit ASCII, as the encoding for 7-bit
       ASCII stays the same for all ASCII variants and UTF-8.

       LUKS header: If the header of a LUKS volume gets damaged, all data is
       permanently lost unless you have a header-backup. If a key-slot is
       damaged, it can only be restored from a header-backup or if another
       active key-slot with known passphrase is undamaged. Damaging the LUKS
       header is something people manage to do with surprising frequency. This
       risk is the result of a trade-off between security and safety, as LUKS
       is designed for fast and secure wiping by just overwriting header and
       key-slot area.

       Previously used partitions: If a partition was previously used, it is a
       very good idea to wipe filesystem signatures, data, etc. before
       creating a LUKS or plain dm-crypt container on it. For a quick removal
       of filesystem signatures, use wipefs(8). Take care though that this may
       not remove everything. In particular, MD RAID signatures at the end of
       a device may survive. It also does not remove data. For a full wipe,
       overwrite the whole partition before container creation. If you do not
       know how to do that, the cryptsetup FAQ describes several options.

EXAMPLES
       Example 1: Create LUKS 2 container on block device /dev/sdX.
           sudo cryptsetup --type luks2 luksFormat /dev/sdX

       Example 2: Add an additional passphrase to key slot 5.
           sudo cryptsetup luksAddKey --key-slot 5 /dev/sdX

       Example 3: Create LUKS header backup and save it to file.
           sudo cryptsetup luksHeaderBackup /dev/sdX --header-backup-file
           /var/tmp/NameOfBackupFile

       Example 4: Open LUKS container on /dev/sdX and map it to sdX_crypt.
           sudo cryptsetup open /dev/sdX sdX_crypt

       WARNING: The command in example 5 will erase all key slots.
           Your cannot use your LUKS container afterward anymore unless you
           have a backup to restore.

       Example 5: Erase all key slots on /dev/sdX.
           sudo cryptsetup erase /dev/sdX

       Example 6: Restore LUKS header from backup file.
           sudo cryptsetup luksHeaderRestore /dev/sdX --header-backup-file
           /var/tmp/NameOfBackupFile

RETURN CODES
       Cryptsetup returns 0 on success and a non-zero value on error.

       Error codes are: 1 wrong parameters, 2 no permission (bad passphrase),
       3 out of memory, 4 wrong device specified, 5 device already exists or
       device is busy.

NOTES
   Passphrase processing for PLAIN mode
       Note that no iterated hashing or salting is done in plain mode. If
       hashing is done, it is a single direct hash. This means that
       low-entropy passphrases are easy to attack in plain mode.

       From a terminal: The passphrase is read until the first newline, i.e.
       '\n'. The input without the newline character is processed with the
       default hash or the hash specified with --hash. The hash result will be
       truncated to the key size of the used cipher, or the size specified
       with -s.

       From stdin: Reading will continue until a newline (or until the maximum
       input size is reached), with the trailing newline stripped. The maximum
       input size is defined by the same compiled-in default as for the
       maximum key file size and can be overwritten using --keyfile-size
       option.

       The data read will be hashed with the default hash or the hash
       specified with --hash. The hash result will be truncated to the key
       size of the used cipher, or the size specified with -s.

       Note that if --key-file=- is used for reading the key from stdin,
       trailing newlines are not stripped from the input.

       If "plain" is used as argument to --hash, the input data will not be
       hashed. Instead, it will be zero padded (if shorter than the key size)
       or truncated (if longer than the key size) and used directly as the
       binary key. This is useful for directly specifying a binary key. No
       warning will be given if the amount of data read from stdin is less
       than the key size.

       From a key file: It will be truncated to the key size of the used
       cipher or the size given by -s and directly used as a binary key.

       WARNING: The --hash argument is being ignored. The --hash option is
       usable only for stdin input in plain mode.

       If the key file is shorter than the key, cryptsetup will quit with an
       error. The maximum input size is defined by the same compiled-in
       default as for the maximum key file size and can be overwritten using
       --keyfile-size option.

   Passphrase processing for LUKS
       LUKS uses PBKDF to protect against dictionary attacks and to give some
       protection to low-entropy passphrases (see cryptsetup FAQ).

       From a terminal: The passphrase is read until the first newline and
       then processed by PBKDF2 without the newline character.

       From stdin: LUKS will read passphrases from stdin up to the first
       newline character or the compiled-in maximum key file length. If
       --keyfile-size is given, it is ignored.

       From key file: The complete keyfile is read up to the compiled-in
       maximum size. Newline characters do not terminate the input. The
       --keyfile-size option can be used to limit what is read.

       Passphrase processing: Whenever a passphrase is added to a LUKS header
       (luksAddKey, luksFormat), the user may specify how much the time the
       passphrase processing should consume. The time is used to determine the
       iteration count for PBKDF2 and higher times will offer better
       protection for low-entropy passphrases, but open will take longer to
       complete. For passphrases that have entropy higher than the used key
       length, higher iteration times will not increase security.

       The default setting of one or two seconds is sufficient for most
       practical cases. The only exception is a low-entropy passphrase used on
       a device with a slow CPU, as this will result in a low iteration count.
       On a slow device, it may be advisable to increase the iteration time
       using the --iter-time option in order to obtain a higher iteration
       count. This does slow down all later luksOpen operations accordingly.

   Incoherent behavior for invalid passphrases/keys
       LUKS checks for a valid passphrase when an encrypted partition is
       unlocked. The behavior of plain dm-crypt is different. It will always
       decrypt with the passphrase given. If the given passphrase is wrong,
       the device mapped by plain dm-crypt will essentially still contain
       encrypted data and will be unreadable.

   Supported ciphers, modes, hashes and key sizes
       The available combinations of ciphers, modes, hashes and key sizes
       depend on kernel support. See /proc/crypto for a list of available
       options. You might need to load additional kernel crypto modules in
       order to get more options.

       For the --hash option, if the crypto backend is libgcrypt, then all
       algorithms supported by the gcrypt library are available. For other
       crypto backends, some algorithms may be missing.

   Notes on passphrases
       Mathematics can't be bribed. Make sure you keep your passphrases safe.
       There are a few nice tricks for constructing a fallback, when suddenly
       out of the blue, your brain refuses to cooperate. These fallbacks need
       LUKS, as it's only possible with LUKS to have multiple passphrases.
       Still, if your attacker model does not prevent it, storing your
       passphrase in a sealed envelope somewhere may be a good idea as well.

   Notes on Random Number Generators
       Random Number Generators (RNG) used in cryptsetup are always the kernel
       RNGs without any modifications or additions to data stream produced.

       There are two types of randomness cryptsetup/LUKS needs. One type
       (which always uses /dev/urandom) is used for salts, the AF splitter and
       for wiping deleted keyslots.

       The second type is used for the volume key. You can switch between
       using /dev/random and /dev/urandom here, see --use-random and
       --use-urandom options. Using /dev/random on a system without enough
       entropy sources can cause luksFormat to block until the requested
       amount of random data is gathered. In a low-entropy situation (embedded
       system), this can take a very long time and potentially forever. At the
       same time, using /dev/urandom in a low-entropy situation will produce
       low-quality keys. This is a serious problem, but solving it is out of
       scope for a mere man-page. See urandom(4) for more information.

   Authenticated disk encryption (EXPERIMENTAL)
       Since Linux kernel version 4.12 dm-crypt supports authenticated disk
       encryption.

       Normal disk encryption modes are length-preserving (plaintext sector is
       of the same size as a ciphertext sector) and can provide only
       confidentiality protection, but not cryptographically sound data
       integrity protection.

       Authenticated modes require additional space per-sector for
       authentication tag and use Authenticated Encryption with Additional
       Data (AEAD) algorithms.

       If you configure LUKS2 device with data integrity protection, there
       will be an underlying dm-integrity device, which provides additional
       per-sector metadata space and also provide data journal protection to
       ensure atomicity of data and metadata update. Because there must be
       additional space for metadata and journal, the available space for the
       device will be smaller than for length-preserving modes.

       The dm-crypt device then resides on top of such a dm-integrity device.
       All activation and deactivation of this device stack is performed by
       cryptsetup, there is no difference in using luksOpen for integrity
       protected devices. If you want to format LUKS2 device with data
       integrity protection, use --integrity option (see
       cryptsetup-luksFormat(8)).

       Albeit Linux kernel 5.7 added TRIM support for standalone dm-integrity
       devices, cryptsetup(8) can't offer support for discards (TRIM) in
       authenticated encryption mode, because the underlying dm-crypt kernel
       module does not support this functionality when dm-integrity is used as
       auth tag space allocator (see --allow-discards in
       cryptsetup-luksFormat(8)).

       Some integrity modes requires two independent keys (key for encryption
       and for authentication). Both these keys are stored in one LUKS
       keyslot.

       WARNING: All support for authenticated modes is experimental and there
       are only some modes available for now. Note that there are a very few
       authenticated encryption algorithms that are suitable for disk
       encryption. You also cannot use CRC32 or any other non-cryptographic
       checksums (other than the special integrity mode "none"). If for some
       reason you want to have integrity control without using authentication
       mode, then you should separately configure dm-integrity independently
       of LUKS2.

   Notes on loopback device use
       Cryptsetup is usually used directly on a block device (disk partition
       or LVM volume). However, if the device argument is a file, cryptsetup
       tries to allocate a loopback device and map it into this file. This
       mode requires Linux kernel 2.6.25 or more recent which supports the
       loop autoclear flag (loop device is cleared on the last close
       automatically). Of course, you can always map a file to a loop-device
       manually. See the cryptsetup FAQ for an example.

       When device mapping is active, you can see the loop backing file in the
       status command output. Also see losetup(8).

   LUKS2 header locking
       The LUKS2 on-disk metadata is updated in several steps and to achieve
       proper atomic update, there is a locking mechanism. For an image in
       file, code uses flock(2) system call. For a block device, lock is
       performed over a special file stored in a locking directory (by default
       /run/cryptsetup). The locking directory should be created with the
       proper security context by the distribution during the boot-up phase.
       Only LUKS2 uses locks, other formats do not use this mechanism.

   LUKS on-disk format specification
       For LUKS on-disk metadata specification see LUKS1
       <https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/Specification> and
       LUKS2 <https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/LUKS2-docs>.

AUTHORS
       Cryptsetup is originally written by Jana Saout <jana@saout.de>.
       The LUKS extensions and original man page were written by Clemens
       Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>.
       Man page extensions by Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>.
       Man page rewrite and extension by Arno Wagner <arno@wagner.name>.

REPORTING BUGS
       Report bugs at cryptsetup mailing list <cryptsetup@lists.linux.dev> or
       in Issues project section
       <https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/issues/new>.

       Please attach output of the failed command with --debug option added.

SEE ALSO
       Cryptsetup FAQ
       <https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions>

       cryptsetup(8), integritysetup(8) and veritysetup(8)

CRYPTSETUP
       Part of cryptsetup project <https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/>.

cryptsetup 2.7.0                  2024-08-30                     CRYPTSETUP(8)

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