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NAME_CONSTRAINTS_CHECK(3ossl) OpenSSL NAME_CONSTRAINTS_CHECK(3ossl)
NAME
NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check, NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN - check a
certificate's names against a name constraints extension
SYNOPSIS
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
int NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(const X509 *x, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc);
int NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(const X509 *x, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc);
DESCRIPTION
NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check() tests whether the names asserted by
certificate x satisfy the name constraints nc. It implements the
matching primitive of RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.10: given a constraint set
(a NAME_CONSTRAINTS structure containing zero or more permittedSubtrees
and excludedSubtrees) and a candidate certificate, decide whether the
certificate's names fall within the permitted subtrees and outside the
excluded subtrees.
The names considered by NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check() are:
o The certificate's subject distinguished name, matched as a
directoryName general-name type. The subject is considered only
when it is nonempty.
o Each emailAddress attribute appearing within the subject
distinguished name, matched as an rfc822Name general-name type.
These attributes are the historical, pre-SAN way of expressing an
email address in a certificate's subject, and RFC 5280 requires
that they be subjected to name-constraint checking.
o Each entry in the certificate's subject alternative name extension,
matched according to its declared general-name type.
NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check() implements matching for the following general-
name types: directoryName, dNSName, rfc822Name,
uniformResourceIdentifier, and iPAddress. The otherName form
id-on-SmtpUTF8Mailbox (RFC 8398) is additionally matched against
rfc822Name subtrees. Any other general-name type, including
x400Address, ediPartyName, registeredID, and other otherName forms,
yields X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE.
For each name considered, the function evaluates two conditions:
o If nc contains at least one permittedSubtree of the same general-
name type as the name, the name must match at least one of those
permitted subtrees. If nc contains no permitted subtrees of that
type, no permitted-subtrees test is imposed on names of that type.
o The name must not match any excludedSubtree of the same general-
name type in nc.
The function returns at the first violation encountered; it does not
collect or report multiple failures.
For dNSName entries, matching follows the byte/label algorithm of RFC
5280 section 4.2.1.10, which RFC 5280 mandates when no protocol-
specific matching rules apply. Because this match is performed without
awareness of any specific higher-level protocol, additional matching
rules defined by later or more specific protocols must be applied
independently of this function to the certificate chain.
NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check() performs only the constraint match for a
single certificate against a single constraint set. It does not perform
the chain-wide enforcement of RFC 5280 section 6.1.4(g)-(j): callers
wishing to enforce name constraints across an entire certification path
must walk the chain themselves and apply each ancestor's constraint set
to certificates lower in the chain, observing the usual exceptions (for
example, self-issued intermediate certificates are exempt from
constraints imposed by certificates above them, except when they are
the leaf of the chain). For full RFC 5280 name-constraint enforcement
integrated with chain validation, applications should use
X509_verify_cert(3), which performs this internally.
NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check() enforces an implementation limit on the
product of the certificate's name count and the constraint set's
subtree count, to prevent computationally expensive matching on
pathological input. If that limit is exceeded the function returns
X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED without performing any matching. The current
limit is 2**20 (1,048,576) on the product of the name count (subject DN
entries plus subjectAltName entries) and the subtree count
(permittedSubtrees plus excludedSubtrees).
RETURN VALUES
NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check() returns X509_V_OK if every name considered
satisfies the constraints. Otherwise it returns one of the following
X509_V_ERR_* codes:
X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION
A name of a type for which nc contains at least one permitted
subtree failed to match any of those subtrees.
X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION
A name matched an excluded subtree.
X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX
A subtree in nc specified a minimum other than 0 or a maximum at
all. RFC 5280 requires that these GeneralSubtree fields not be
used, and a constraint set that uses them cannot be processed.
X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE
A general-name type for which matching is not implemented was
encountered. The list of supported types is given in the
DESCRIPTION above.
X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX
A name in the certificate is encoded in a way that cannot be
matched (for example, an emailAddress attribute in the subject that
is not encoded as an IA5String).
X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
The product of the certificate's name count and the constraint
set's subtree count exceeded the implementation limit; no matching
was performed.
Other X509_V_ERR_* codes may be returned by deeper name-matching
helpers (for example, codes arising from individual general-name type
comparisons). Callers should treat the return value as the
authoritative success/failure signal and treat any value other than
X509_V_OK as a failure, rather than enumerating the specific codes
above.
NOTES
NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check() does not match the certificate's commonName
against dNSName name constraints; that check is provided by a separate
function, NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(). The commonName-as-DNS-identity
practice is a legacy concern: modern certificates assert DNS identities
through dNSName entries in the subject alternative name extension,
which NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check() already covers.
NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN() is required only for older certificates
that express a DNS identity through their commonName instead of, or in
addition to, the SAN; for certificates conforming to modern profiles a
call to NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check() alone is generally sufficient.
BUGS
RFC 9525's wildcard semantics apply only to presented-identifier
matching for TLS service identity, and explicitly call out they are not
valid for any other purpose; they do not define wildcard handling for
name-constraint matching. NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check() therefore follows
RFC 5280's requirements for when this is undefined, and treats the *
character in a dNSName as a literal label component, per the RFC 5280
algorithm, which is often contrary to caller expectation.
Even if specified in the future, due to the "fallback implementation"
nature of matching wildcards in SAN dNSName entries specified by RFC
5280, name constraint behaviour in the presence of wildcards should not
be strictly relied upon across implementations and protocols. This
matters most for the use of excluded names constraints, which should
not be relied upon to reliably constrain signing certificates for a PKI
in a security dependent manner unless the consumers of these
certificates are themselves known to be constrained by other means to
only use implementations that provide different semantics, or the PKI
can be constrained by other means to ensure that wildcards are never
issued from such signing certificates.
SEE ALSO
X509_verify_cert(3), X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(3)
HISTORY
NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check() was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN() was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2026 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
3.5.9 2026-09-29 NAME_CONSTRAINTS_CHECK(3ossl)
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